Keeping up with business and economy news from Uzbekistan
Provided by AGP
Alona Lebedieva: The South Caucasus is becoming a space where no one has the right to dictate the rules
Alona Lebedieva
On May 5, 2026, the European Union and Armenia announced the Connectivity Partnership – cooperation in transport, energy and digital links. The EU connects this initiative with Global Gateway and the Cross-Regional Connectivity Agenda, which aims to link Europe with the South Caucasus, Turkey and Central Asia. But the key issue here is not only infrastructure. The key issue is the political signal: countries that were previously forced to build their security and economy with a constant eye on Moscow are increasingly looking for other centers of support.
According to Alona Lebedieva, owner of the Ukrainian diversified industrial and investment group Aurum Group, such initiatives show that the region is gradually moving beyond the logic of “spheres of influence.” Armenia is not simply looking for new transport routes or energy connections. It is testing the possibility of living in a region where security, trade, investment and development do not depend on Russian permission.
For Moscow, this is a painful signal. That is why Russia’s reaction was so nervous: the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Armenia was allegedly being “drawn” into the EU’s anti-Russian orbit, while Reuters links these statements to the growing tension between Moscow and Yerevan.
This does not mean that Armenia will completely break ties with Russia tomorrow. Such logic would be too simplistic. Armenia remains connected to Russian economic structures, through the Eurasian Economic Union. But something else is important: Russia’s monopoly on the role of the “sole guarantor” for Armenia has already been broken. After Nagorno-Karabakh, Yerevan saw that Russian security guarantees can be empty, and dependence on Moscow can be a limitation, not protection.
Here it is important to look more broadly – not only at the South Caucasus. A similar logic is visible in Central Asia. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are not acting revolutionarily and are not announcing a demonstrative break with Russia. They are acting pragmatically: expanding their room for maneuver, diversifying economic ties, strengthening contacts with the EU, China, Turkey, the Gulf states and other partners.
Alona Lebedieva emphasizes that leaving Russia’s orbit does not always look like a loud political statement. Often, it happens more quietly – through infrastructure, trade, investment, raw material chains, energy, digital connections and new formats of partnership. These processes gradually change the real balance of power in the region.
Kazakhstan has a special significance in this new architecture. It is the largest economy in Central Asia and an important player in critical materials, transport, digital infrastructure and green transformation. The European Commission calls Kazakhstan a strategic partner for sustainable transport, digital connectivity, critical raw materials, the green transition and governance reforms.
Uzbekistan is another important example. It has a dynamic economy, a large domestic market and an ambition to be an independent center of gravity, not a periphery between Russia and China. The IMF forecasts real GDP growth of 6.8% for Uzbekistan in 2026, supported by reforms, investment, demand, remittances and high gold prices.
That is why Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are important to mention in this context. They show that the post-Soviet space is ceasing to be a territory where Russia automatically has the right of first say. Russia may retain influence, but it is no longer the only center around which these countries build their future.
The first EU–Central Asia summit in Samarkand in 2025 was indicative. The EU and the countries of the region upgraded cooperation to a strategic partnership and announced a Global Gateway investment package of €12 billion for transport, critical materials, digital connectivity, water and energy. This does not mean that Europe will automatically displace Russia or China. But it does mean that Central Asia is ceasing to be a “closed backyard” for foreign imperial interests.
For Ukraine, this is of fundamental importance. The Russian imperial model is based not only on military force. It is based on dependencies – energy, transport, trade, security and information dependencies. Every country that reduces such dependence weakens the model of Russian influence.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has forced many states to look at Moscow in a new way. If Russia previously sold itself as a guarantor of stability, now more countries see it as a source of instability. If Russian presence could seem like insurance, now it increasingly looks like a risk. If geo-economic and foreign trade dependence on Russia was once perceived as inevitable, today more countries are looking for ways to reduce it.
Therefore, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are not separate cases. They are parts of one large process: the post-Soviet space is ceasing to be territory where Russia automatically dictates terms. The countries of the region are beginning to act as independent players – to seek balance, new markets, new guarantees and new formats of development.
For Ukraine, this opens a political and economic window of opportunity. We must speak with these countries not only through the prism of war, but also through the prism of common interest: secure routes, trade development, industrial cooperation, energy, the agricultural sector, critical infrastructure, reconstruction and new links between the Black Sea, the Caucasus and Central Asia.
As Alona Lebedieva notes, Ukraine should see in these changes not only the weakening of Russia, but also the formation of a new space of opportunities. The South Caucasus is becoming a region where Europe’s strategic capacity is being tested. Central Asia is becoming a space where Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan show that multi-vector policy can protect sovereignty. And for Ukraine, all of this is part of a broader picture: the fewer countries depend on Russia, the fewer opportunities Russia has to blackmail, block and dictate the rules.
Russia has not yet lost its influence in these regions. But it is already losing the most important thing – the right to consider this influence unconditional. And this is strategically important for Ukraine.
Alona Lebedieva
Aurum Group
email us here
Legal Disclaimer:
EIN Presswire provides this news content "as is" without warranty of any kind. We do not accept any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information contained in this article. If you have any complaints or copyright issues related to this article, kindly contact the author above.
